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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the incidence of agricultural commodity programs. Producers 
advocate commodity programs and receive price subsidies, but free entry and perfectly elastic 
supplies of nonland inputs ensure that landowners extract the entire surplus from price 
subsidies. Moreover, an increase in the target price raises the land rent more than 
proportionately. Although landless producers benefit from commodity programs in the short 
run, they do not in the long run. Roughly 60 percent of program benefits go to producers who 
own land, and the remainder to landowners. 
IMPACTS AND INCIDENCE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY PROGRAMS 
"The only farm resource whose price or annual use value is significantly affected by 
government programs, either through higher output prices or deficiency payments, is 
land." (D. Gale Johnson, 1986, p. 22) 
1. Introduction 
Since the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, commodity programs 
have had a major impact on resource use and returns to factors in U.S. agriculture. Farm 
price supports are often justified as a means of redistributing income from consumers to 
commodity producers (Harberger; Gardner, 1983, 1987). An important issue is whether 
producers are the ultimate beneficiaries of commodity programs. 
Floyd, Paul R. Johnson, Wallace, Rausser and Freebairn, and Alston and Hurd 
investigated social costs of commodity programs. These studies are based on comparison of 
producer and consumer surpluses that depend on price elasticities of demand and short' run 
supply curves. For example, Floyd employed linearly homogeneous production functions 
and demonstrated that in the short run farm price supports benefit landowners more than 
producers. 1 Recently, D. Gale Johnson (1986) focused on long run distributional 
consequences of commodity programs and argued that in the long run landowners are the 
recipients of all commodity program benefits. If they do not benefit in the long run, why 
do producers advocate price support programs for agricultural commodities? The puzzle is 
resolved (i) if rent adjustment is slow and producers gain in the short run, or (ii) if 
producers are also landowners. Although the short run incidence of the benefits of 
commodity programs will be influenced by the speed of rent adjustment, the long run 
incidence will be determined by the proportion of farmland owned by producers. 
This paper investigates the short run and long run incidences of commodity program 
benefits. We assume that nonland inputs are supplied by competitive firms so that the long 
run supplies of the nonland inputs are perfectly elastic. Free entry insures that in long run 
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equilibrium all benefits accrue to landowners. This increase in the rental price of land 
permits landowners to extract the entire producer surplus.2 Moreover. long run equilibrium 
land rent rises more than proportionately with increases in the target price. 
2. Price Supports and Land Demand 
Our analysis is based on a stylized scenario of agricultural production with the 
following assumptions. 
(a) Timing of Input Decisions: The target prices are announced at the beginning of the 
annual production period. Producers then make land use decisions which depend upon 
the target price and observed input prices. Once land is allocated, it becomes fixed ex 
QQU. Other nonland input decisions, however, can be made after the land is allocated. 
(b) Modified Competition: Product and factor markets are assumed to be competitive. At 
the beginning of the period producers have free entry and exit.3 However, perfect 
competition is modified by government intervention through target prices. 
(c) Price Subsidy: To study the long run impacts of commodity programs, target prices are 
assumed to be maintained by a price subsidy, rather than by a buffer stock. 
(d) Identical Producers: Producers are assumed to use identical production technology. 
(e) Two Primary Inputs: Producers obtain output q by using two primary inputs, land L 
and the nonland input X. The nonland input X is a composite input including labor, 
chemicals and capital equipment used in agriculture, but exclusive of land. 
Assumption (c) eliminates the complications arising from buffer stocks and attendant 
storage cost problems.~ In practice, the government may hold some inventories in long run 
equilibrium. 5 For example, an equilibrium buffer stock may be established such that its 
size does not change from period to period. However, the government will not alter the size 
of buffer stock when the market is in stationary long run equ"ilibrium. For this reason 
buffer stocks are not included in the analysis. 
Producers may differ in farm size and production cost. The sole purpose of assumption 
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{d) is to investigate the behavior of the representative producer.6 Thus, all producers are 
assumed to participate in the commodity program. The total land A eligible for program 
benefits is assumed to be fixed in the short run, but is positively related to land rent in the 
long run. 
Ex Post Composite Input Decision 
Because land is a primary input whose supply is relatively inelastic, we distinguish land 
from other nonland inputs. Important nonland inputs include a primary factor, labor, and a 
host of intermediate inputs such as combines, specialized machinery, chemicals, and raw 
materials purchased from other competitive industries. These nonland inputs are lumped 
together and are treated as a composite input X for two reasons.7 First, the proportion of 
the labor force employed in the agricultural sector is relatively small in most developed 
countries. For example, increases in labor demand in the agricultural sector are not likely to 
significantly affect the wage rate in the United States. Thus, the wage rate is assumed to be 
exogenous. Second, the intermediate inputs used in agriculture are supplied by competitive 
firms in other sectors, and their prices are assumed to be given. For instance, increases in 
demand for farm chemicals may raise the prices of chemicals in the short run, but because 
they are produced by competitive firms, the long run supply of the intermediate inputs is 
perfectly elastic. 
Let p* be the target price of output, and let w and r be the price of the nonland . 
composite input and the rental price of land, respectively. At the beginning of the period (t 
= 0), the representative producer chooses the amount of land L to cultivate. Ideally, farm 
size can be measured by capacity or output level. A farm with 600 acres and one worker is 
not necessarily larger than a farm with 500 acres and 10 workers. Because producers are 
assumed to use identical technology, land is a useful proxy for "farm size" or capacity. Land 
is a quasi-fixed input; it is a variable input at the beginning of the production period, but 
once land is allocated the producer can only alter nonland inputs. 
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Output is realized at the end of the period (t = I). The total output generally depends 
on the distribution of the composite input over the production period. For simplicity, we 
assume that the total quantity of the composite input X is applied to land at a constant rate 
during the unit production period between time 0 and 1.8 Then the output depends on the 
total amounts of X and L employed, and is given by a concave production function, 
q = F(X,L). 
The competitive producer's problem at the end of the period is to choose X to 
maximize profit, 9 
.- = p•F(X,L) - wX - rL, 
where w and r are prices of X and L, respectively, and rL is the cost of land rent which is 
fixed ex post. Because the composite input X is supplied by competitive industries, w -is 
assumed to be fixed. The first order condition is p•FL(X,L) - w = 0. Concavity of the 
production function insures that the composite input demand, X= X(p•,w,L), is inversely 
related to its price (ax;aw = ljp•Fxx < 0) and that an increase in the output price shifts 
the composite input demand schedule to the right (ax;ap• = - w;p•2Fxx > 0). If L and X 
are complements (FxL > 0), then an increase in farm size L shifts the composite input 
demand schedule to the right (ax;aL = - FxL/Fxx > 0). On the other hand, if they are 
substitutes (FxL < 0), an increase in L shifts demand for X to the left. 
The ex post or short run supply function is written as 
q(p•, w ,L) = F[X(p•, w ,L ),L ]. (I) 
By concavity of the production function, we obtain aqfaw = wjp•2Fxx < 0, aqjap• = 
- w2p•3Fxx > 0, and dq/dL = FL - Fx(FxdFxxl > 0. It is straightforward to show that 
dq/dL > 0 if land L is a normal factor.10 
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Ex Ante Land Decision 
The representative firm incorporates the composite input demand function X(p*,w,L) 
when making a land decision. The producer chooses L at the beginning of the period to 
maximize profit11 
.- = p*F[X(p*,w,L),L]- wX(p*,w,L)- rL. (2) 
The first order condition is p*FL - r = 0. The land demand function derived. can then be 
written as L = L(p*,w,r). From the first order condition, 
BL/Bp* =- .BFxx/p*t.. > 0 
aL;aw =- FxL/p*t.. 




where D. = FLL Fxx - (FxL)2 > 0 by concavity of the production function, and ,8 = 
FL - Fx(FxL/Fxxl = dq/dL > 0 if land is a normal factor. 
Substituting L(p*, w,r) into (I) yields the ex ante supply function: 
q = q[p*,w,L(p*,w,r)]. (I') 
Differentiating (I') with respect to p* yields 
dq/dp* = (Bq/Bp*) + (dq/dL)(BL/Bp*). 
Thus, if L is a normal factor, the ex ante supply is more elastic than the ex post supply, i.e., 
dq/dp* > 8q/Bp*.12 
3. Free Entry, Farm Size and Factor Returns 
Free entry implies that equilibrium adjustments in factor returns occur at the beginning 
of the period when the government announces the target price. In realiry, changes in the 
target price may not trigger instantaneous entry or exit of producers, and it may take several 
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periods before the equilibrium number of firms is restored. The simplifying assumption of 
free entry at the beginning of the production period is used to investigate the long run 
responses in factor returns and farm size. The plausibility of this assumption is discussed 
later by comparing the price elasticities of current rent and the long run equilibrium rent. 
The land demand function L(p*, w,r) must satisfy an additional condition that profit be 
nonnegative. Substituting L(p*, w ,r) into (2) yields the indirect profit function 
.-(p*,w,r) = p*F[X(p*,w,L(p*,w,r)),L(p*,w,r)]- wX(p*,w,L(p*,w,r))- rL(p*,w,r). 
For the farmers to survive, the output and factor prices must be such that .-(p*,w,r) is 
greater than or equal to zero. If .-(p*,w,r) is negative, then potential producers simply do 
not enter the market and some of the incumbent producers will exit from the market since 
zero profit is guaranteed by exiting from the market. Moreover, if .-(p*, w ,r) is positive, 
then entry of new producers will be triggered. The number of producers is stable and.the 
market is in long run equilibrium if the representative producer earns zero profit, 
.-(p*,w,r) = 0. (4) 
The zero profit condition states that for any target price p*, there exist many input 
price combinations that yield zero profit. We now derive the input price frontier in the 
(w,r) space that satisfies the zero profit constraint in (4). Let aL = L/q and ax= Xjq be the 
amounts of land and the composite input used per unit of output produced, respectively. 
Note that profit maximization requires cost minimization. The least cost combinations of 
inputs to produce one unit of output generally depend on the input prices. Thus, the input-
output ratios can be written as aL = adw,r) and ax= ax(w,r). The unit cost is 
g(w,r,q) = aL(w,r,q)r + ax(w,r,q)w. (5) 
The zero profit condition in (4) can be rewritten 
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p*q - g(w,r,q)q = 0, 
where c(q,w,r} = g(w,r,q}q is total cost. The first order condition for optimal output is 
p* - gqq - g = 0, (6} 
where gqq - g = cq is marginal cost. Dividing the zero profit condition by q gives 
p* - g(w,r,q} = 0, (7} 
which defines a unit cost frontier in (w,r} space along which unit cost is equal to the target 
price p*. In view of (6}, we have gq = 0. In other words, long run equilibrium is 
characterized by the minimum of unit production cost. 
Three Propositions on Long Run Equilibrium 
There are two ways to assess the long run impacts of a change in the target price on 
land rent. If agriculture accounts for a large fraction of gross national product, a general 
equilibrium production model with two sectors, agriculture and manufacture, can then be 
developed to assess the impacts of changes in the target price. For example, if the price of 
the composite input is significantly affected, the two sector model is relevant and the well 
known Stolper-Samuelson theorem can then be used to assess the impacts on rent of a 
change in the support price. 
If agriculture accounts for a small fraction of total output, as in many developed 
countries, a partial equilibrium model is more appropriate in which land is a specific factor 
in agriculture. Specifically, if agriculture uses inputs such as labor and intermediate inputs 
commonly used in other industries, and if agricultural input demands account for a small 
fraction of aggregate input demands in these markets, then the increased demand for the 
composite input in agriculture will not significantly raise the price of the nonland composite 
input. D. Gale Johnson ( 1986) argued that rising target prices are unlikely to raise the 
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returns to farm labor. Even earlier D. Gale Johnson (1973, p. 186) also observed that the 
prices of "most inputs purchased from the non-farm sector of the economy, such as 
fertilizers, tractors, fuel and insecticides, and feeds and feedstuffs" are affected little by the 
level of farm output prices. Thus, the price of the composite nonland input is assumed 
constant and insensitive to changes in the output price. 
In contrast, land is specific to agriculture, and the quantity of land supplied is fixed in 
the short run. Burt (p. ll) maintains that "the amount of farmland available may change 
. . 
gradually over time, but these changes are relatively insensitive to farm prices because they 
emanate from government appropriations" such as reclamations, highway developments and 
urban growth. Moreover, to control program cost, the government often limits annually the 
quantity of land "eligible" for price subsidy programs.13 Thus, the supply of land is likely 
to be relatively inelastic even in the long run. 
Because the supply of land is not perfectly elastic, new producers can enter the market 
only by bidding up the rental price of land. Subsequent to an increase in the target price, 
producer surplus increases and rental price of land increases. However, this induced 
increase in land rent causes the representative producer to use nonland inputs more 
intensively. If the long run equilibrium farm size L * decreases (increases) with p*, then 
entry (exit) of firms continues until a new market equilibrium is restored at a higher land 
rent. It is shown shortly that, under reasonable conditions, an increase in the target price 
only raises land rent and does not affect the long run equilibrium farm size L*. In this case 
an increase in the target price initially raises entry pressure, but the latter is completely 
offset by the rise in rental rate and no entry actually occurs. 
Recall from (7) that a given target price p* defines a factor price frontier g(w,r,q) or a 
locus of input prices (w,r) that are consistent with the long run equilibrium. If the price of 
the composite input w is fixed, however, there exists a unique rent r* "r*(p*,w) that yields 
zero profit. Let the asterisk (*) denote that the variable is evaluated in long run 
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equilibrium, corresponding to target price p*. 
Let qi* denote the long run equilibrium output associated with the target price Pi*. For 
given w, the long run equilibrium rent r1* is obtained at point A, the intersection of the 
unit cost frontier g1(w,r,q1) and the vertical line w in Figure I. Consider now the effect of 
an increase in the target price from p1* to p2 •. This increase in the target price shifts the 
unit cost frontier from g1(w,r,q1) to g2(w,r,q2). The new equilibrium can be established at 
point B, at the intersection of the vertical line w and g2(w,r,q2). If the factor prices do not 
change as in the short run, an increase in the target price will benefit every producer, i.e., 
a1r I ap* = q* > 0. At p2 • every producer expects to earn a positive economic profit, and 
hence entry pressure exists. If the rental price of land is fixed at r 1* or rises below the new 
equilibrium level r 2 •, entry occurs. Free entry assures that, in the long run, the producer 
surplus vanishes and the market rental price rises to the equilibrium level, r*. Thus, if the 
supply of the composite input is perfectly elastic and free entry is guaranteed. then in the 
long run higher target prices cannot benefit landless producers. 14 The landowners 
eventually exact the entire surplus from the higher target price that would accrue to 
producers if rent were fixed. 
Price Elasticity of Equilibrium Rent 
We now investigate how the long run equilibrium rent r*(p*,w) responds to a change in 
the target price. Observe that the zero profit condition does not directly depend upon the 
aggregate land supply. Thus, (4) or (7) contains sufficient information to determine how r* 
will respond to a change in p* for given w. Accordingly, long run equilibrium rent 
r*(p*,w) is independent of whether the aggregate land supply A(r) is vertical or positively 
sloped. Totally differentiating (4) yields 
dr*/dp* = - 11: /11: = q*/L* P r· ' 
where (q/L) is the average product of land. The price elasticity of equilibrium rent is 
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e" (dr*/dp*)(p*/r*) = p*q*(r*L* = I;eL > I, 
where eL " r*L • /p*q* is the distributional share of land or the proportion of revenue spent 
on rent, which is less than unity.16 
In the short run the eligible land is controlled by government. The eligible land can 
increase with the rent in the long run. 16 Let A(r) be the total land supply, A'(r) 2: 0, and 
let R • = r• A(r*) denote the total rental income of the landowners in long run equilibrium. 
The elasticity of rental income with respect to price is 
e" (dR*(dp*)(p*/R*) = e(l + <L) > I, 
where <L "(dA/dr)(r/A) is the rent elasticity of land supply, <L 2: 0. If the land supply is 
fixed, <L is zero and e reduces to e. If A'(r) 2: 0, then rental income rises faster than rent. 
PROPOSITION 1: Assume that entry is free and that the supply of the composite input is 
perfectly elastic. Then the price elasticity of long run equilibrium rent is e " 
(dr*/dp*)(p*/r*) = I/9L > I, and the price elasticity of long run equilibrium rental income 
is e "(dR*/p*)(p*/R*) =(I+ <L)/9L >e. 
If the rental price of land were perfectly flexible or entry free, then the equilibrium 
adjustment would occur within a single production period. If the market adjustment of rent 
is slow, the price elasticity of current rent will be less thane, and can be less than unity. 
Let <* be the long run price elasticity of rent, and let <, " (ar,(p,)(p,/r,) be the elasticity of 
"current" rent with respect to the target price, and where r, and p, are the land rent and the 
target price in the current period. Then the index E, " •,! <* provides an indirect measure 
of "ease" of entry.17 If E, = I, entry is free, and E, = 0 represents the situation where 
entry is blocked as in a monopoly. 
Teigen (1987, p. 37) reported the price elasticity of farm family income by sales class 
for 1983. Farm family income is the sum of farm income and nonfarm income of farm 
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families. For producers with sales of more than $40,000 in 1983, the elasticity of current 
farm family income with respect to the target price exceeded 3, whereas the elasticity was a 
little above unity for producers with sales below $10,000. 18 A very small fraction of farm 
family income in the latter group is likely to come from rental income, while a higher 
proportion of farm family income of producers in the former group is from owning land. 
The elasticity of rental income would be even higher than that of farm family income if 
farm families have non-rental income sources, including off -farm income. 
Short Run and Long Run Incidences of Program Benefits 
Scott has compared the net rent and the average price of corn per bushel in Illinois 
between 1959 and 1982. The average price of corn was roughly $1.00 between 1959 and 
1962, rose to $1.26 in 1970, $2.00 in 1973, and $3.00 in 1974, and fell to $2.50 in 1982. 
The net rent to landowners was roughly $23 between 1959 and 1962, rose to $33 in 1970, 
$85 in 1973, and $107 in 1974, and then declined to $90 in 1982. Ordinary Least Square 
estimates for parameters of a linear model relating "current" rent to the average corn price 
imply an elasticity of 1.35.19 
If it takes more than one period for the rent to reach the long run equilibrium value 
r*, the elasticity of "current" rent with respect to the target price, <, = (ar,;ap,)(p1/r,), will 
be less than the long run equilibrium price elasticity of rent, <*. If the target price is raised 
and maintained for many periods, '• wiii approach its limiting value<* "' p*q*jr*L • as t 
approaches oo. Because the average land share rL/pq for corn in Illinois between 1959 and 
1982 was about 30 percent, the implied value of<* was 3.33. Since <1/<* = 0.41, roughly 40 
percent of the equilibrium rent adjustment was made within a year. 
Scott's data also show that sizable profits accrue in the short run to producers who do 
not own the land. In the short run, the zero profit condition does not hold, and hence p*q* 
= rL + wX +.-,or 
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(8) 
where aL = L/q and ax = X/q are the input-output coefficients, and p = 1rjq is per unit 
profit. In terms of proportional changes, (8) can be rewritten 
(8') 
where "L = rL/p*q, "x = wLjp*q and "p = pjp* are the distributional shares of land, the 
composite input and short run profit, respectively. The land share "L was 0.3, so the 
combined share of the composite input and farm entrepreneurial input was 0.7, and the 
elasticity of their combined return with respect to the target price was 0.86.20 
If all producers were owner-operators they would be the single beneficiaries of price 
subsidies. Proposition 1 indicates that the long run incidence of benefits of commodity 
programs depends on landownership of producers. In actuality, however, there is no clear-
cut demographic division of producers and landlords, because some producers also are 
landowners and some owners are part owners. For our purpose, however, an operational 
distinction can be made between the land operated and the land leased. Bernat (p. 20, Table 
13) reported that of the 932 million acres operated in 1982, 3 77 million acres were rented 
and operated in 1982.21 That is, about 40 percent of the operating land was rented to 
other producers. Similarly, the USDA (1988) reports that the total land in farms was 987 
million acres in 1982. Full owners operated 34.7 percent and part owners operated 53.8· 
percent of land in farms. If we assume that part owners owned 50 percent of land owned, 
the total land owned by producers would be 61.6 percent. These land ownership patterns 
imply that approximately 40 percent of program benefits in the long run went to landowners 
who were not producers. 
Target Price and Equilibrium Farm Size 
Inasmuch as landless producers can benefit from price subsidies in the short run, 
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prospects of higher profits will affect land demand in the current period. Landless owners 
reap windfall gains or losses in the short run until a new long run equilibrium is established. 
If a change in the target price is permanent, no benefits accrue to landless producers once 
the new long run equilibrium is established. However, because the induced change in land 
rental alters the factor proportions to minimize production cost, a permanent change in the 
target price may increase or decrease the long run equilibrium farm size L *. 
We now investigate how an increase in the target price affects the long run farm size 
and the number of farmers. Let L* and N* respectively denote long run equilibrium farm 
size and the number of farmers corresponding to target price p*. Then long run equilibrium 
farm size is equal to land demand when r = r*. Thus L* can be written L* = L(p*,r*,w). 
The equilibrium number of farmers N* can be obtained by dividing the aggregate land 
supply A(r*) by L*, i.e., N*(p*,r*,w)" A(r*)/L(p*,r*,w). 
Recall that profit 1r(p*, w ,r) is zero and the optimal value of land L * is the farm size in 
long run equilibrium. To obtain the equilibrium farm size, we use p = 0 and solve for L in 
(8). An increase in the target price affects the equilibrium farm size L * directly, holding 
rent constant, and also indirectly via the adjustment in the equilibrium rent r*. The total 
effect on the equilibrium farm size is 
dL*/dp* = aL;ap* + (aL;ar)(dr*/dp*), 
where the first term on the right side is the direct effect, and the second term is the 
indirect effect. Using (3a) and (3c), we obtain 
dL*jdp* = (q*jL*- dq/dL)Fxx/P*~ =(I - o)qFxx/P*~L*, (9a) 
where c5 = (dqjdL)(L/q) is the land elasticity of output. 
PROPOSITION 2: Assume that the total land supply is fixed and entry is free, and 
consider an increase in the target price p*. Then 
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(i) L • decreases, increases or remains constant according to whether 6 is Jess than, 
greater than or equal to unity, and 
(ii) N* increases, decreases or remains constant according to whether 6 is less than, 
greater than or equal to unity. 
This proposition indicates that the land elasticity of output plays a key role in determining 
the impacts of price supports on the industry structure. It is widely believed that land yield 
(q/L) is independent of farm size.22 In this instance, changes in the target prices have no 
impact on the long run equilibrium farm size L •. 
D. Gale Johnson (1986), Gardner (1987), and Teigen have reported subsidies and the 
numbers of producers participating in major U.S. commodity programs. Price subsidies 
declined for most of the commodities, remained stable for rice and barley, and increased for 
milk between. 1968 and 1978 (Gardner, 1987).23 The number of producers, however, 
declined in all commodity groups between 1949 and 1978. If land yield is independent of 
farm size, then the continued decline in the number of commodity producers must be 
attributed to other factors (e.g. technological advance), and not to declining target prices as 
has been suggested. 24 
Target Price and Supply Response 
We now examine how the aggregate supply responds to changes in the target price. 
Assume that the land elasticity of output 6 is unity and the aggregate land supply is fixed. 
The long run equilibrium output of the representative producer is obtained by substituting 
L(p*,w,r) into(!): 
q*(p*,w,r) = q((p*,w,L(p*,w,r)]. 
Differentiating q* with respect to p* yields 
dq*/dp* = oqfop• + (dq/dL)(dL*/dp*) = aq;ap > o. 
15 
Recall that the equilibrium farm size L • and the number of firms N* are not affected by 
changes in the target price. But long run equilibrium output q* rises with the target price, 
because the representative producer uses the nonland input more intensively as the 
equilibrium rental price r• rises. Note that S = l implies that dN*/dp* = (A'/L*)(dr/dp*) ~ 
0. Thus, the long run equilibrium industry output Q* = N*q* also increases with the target 
price (dQ* jdp* > 0). 
PROPOSITION 3: Assume that S = l. Then the long run equilibrium firm output q* and 
the aggregate supply of output Q* increase with the target price. 
Gardner (1987) reported the "long run" supply elasticities of 17 commodity groups for three 
years (1927, 1953, and 1978). For all commodity groups the long run supply elasticities 
rarely exceeded unity, except for dairy in 1927. These data indicate that the long run 
supplies of these commodities are generally price inelastic. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In the case of net rent in Illinois between 1959 and 1982, the current price elasticity of 
rent exceeded unity, and about 40 percent of long run rent adjustment was made within a 
year. This example shows that equilibrium rental adjustments may not be fully made within 
a single year. This empirical evidence is consistent with Gardner's position that landless 
producers gain from commodity programs in the short run. But the theory supports D .. Gale 
Johnson's (1973, 1986) observation that commodity programs mainly benefit landowners in 
the long run. Although producers receive price subsidies, free entry and perfectly elastic 
supply of the composite input insure that landowners eventually extract the entire benefits 
from price subsidies and that landless producers do not benefit from commodity programs in 
the long run. Inasmuch as about sixty percent of the U.S. farmland is owned by operating 
producers, roughly sixty percent of the benefits of commodity programs goes ultimately to 
U.S. commodity producers in the form of "rent." 
16 
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.FOOTNOTES 
• The authors are grateful to William Meyers, Bruce Gardner and two anonymous 
referees for their helpful comments. The usual caveats apply. Journal Paper No. J-13968 
of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa. Project No. 
2681. . 
I. Floyd's model can be viewed as either short or long run, depending on the value of factor 
supply elasticities. If factor supplies are perfectly elastic, then in the absence of government 
intervention the long run supply curve should be horizontal. Floyd used a positively sloped 
industry supply curve, which implies that some nonland inputs are fixed. While 
acknowledging that the long run supply of labor is almost perfectly elastic and that of capital 
even more elastic, Floyd assumed that the elasticities of these inputs were between I and 3, 
indicating that he was dealing with short run. 
2. In some commodity programs (e.g., tobacco) output is controlled by production quotas. In 
this case potential entrants bid up the rental price of quota rights, rather than inputs. 
3. Here free entry means unrestricted entry, not costless entry. New entrants must purchase 
or rent eligible land in the government program. If an incumbent farmer is replaced by a new 
entrant, they may incur transactions cost even though the number of farmers remains the 
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same. This transaction cost is ignored. Entry of a single firm does not raise the cost of entry. 
At the market level entry of many firms raises the cost of fixed inputs such as land. 
4. Obviously, if price is maintained by buffer stocks, an alternative model is required to 
take the welfare losses from storage cost into account. 
5. Here we are considering long run equilibrium of the industry consistent with a given 
target price, and not describing competitive equilibrium in a general equilibrium context. 
6. Obviously, production costs may differ among producers, and the intent of the 
assumption is not a realistic description of the agricultural commodity market. 
7. Although breaking down the nonland inputs into labor and other intermediate inputs may 
make the model more general and the analysis more complex, little additional insight is 
obtained. 
8. Thus, the changes in output arising from nonuniform application of the composite input 
are not captured by the production function. This simplification is employed for practical 
purposes. For instance, corn yields can be fairly accurately predicted by total plant-available 
nitrogen and soil moisture in late spring (Blackmer et al.). 
9. Here, the distinction between ex ante and ex post refers to the beginning and end of the 
period. Land decision made at t = 0 is called an ex ante decision. The composite input X is 
continuously applied to fixed land between time 0 and l. Because the total application of X is 
completed at t = 1, the composite input decision is termed an ex post decision. 
10. Consider the problem of minimizing cost C = wX + rL to produce a given output, q-
F(X,L) = 0. The cost minimizing combination of inputs depends on the relative factor price, 
w(r, and the output constraint q. Land is considered a normal factor if the .cost minimizing 
level of L increases with output (dL/dq > 0), and is considered an inferior factor if it 
decreases with output (dL/dq < 0). It can be shown that L is a normal factor if FI, -
Fx(Fx:L/Fxxl ~ 0. Complementarity of land and the composite input is a suffic1ent 
conditiOn for both L and X to be normal factors. 
11. In the absence of acreage restriction, the representative producer rents if he does not own 
land, and the implicit rent is included in the production cost if he owns the land. 
12. Since land can only be adjusted ex ante, the ex ante supply will generally be more elastic 
than the ex post supply. Although an increase in the target price p* increases the ex ante land 
demand (aL(ap• > 0), the increased land demand may decrease output supplied if dq/dL = FL 
- Fx(FxL/Fxxl < 0 (i.e., when land is an inferior input). 
13. This limit applies to the current production period. Obviously, it can be raised over time. 
14. If the supply of the composite input X is not perfectly elastic, some of the surplus will go 
to the suppliers of X. 
15. Floyd used a linearly homogeneous production function and factor supplies with constant 
elasticities and showed that e > I if land supply is less elastic than the other input. 
16. The size of the eligible land L is politically determined in the short run. However, as the 
rent increases, there will be increased pressure to allow more land in the commodity program. 
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17. Price expectations may retard the market adjustment of rent. For example, if the target 
price increases temporarily, the market adjustment of rent would be slower than for a 
permanent increase in the target price. 
18. Because the nonfarm income component of farm family income is independent of the 
support price, the price elasticity of the farm income component of farm family income is 
higher than the reported elasticity. 
19. The OLS result is: 
r, = -19.6568 + 44.7856P1; R2 = 91. (5.5457) (2.9873) 
The coefficient of the corn price was statistically significant at the I percent level, with !-
statistic equal to 15.0. 
20. An analogy can be made between the short run gainers of price supports and the "early 
birds" in the treadmill theory. See Cochrane, Chapter 19. As the support price increases 
existing farmers gain in the short run. As land rent increases, however, both the existing 
producers and entrailts receive zero profit. If the target price declines, the exiting farmers 
become the early birds. 
21. Of course, the rented farmland is in large part owned by other producers who play dual 
roles as landowner and operator. Bernat conveniently defines the total land operated (932 
million acres) as the sum of the land operated by owner (555 million acres, 60 percent) a(ld the 
land owned and rented out (377 million acres, 40 percent), which also is equal to the land 
rented and operated. Of the land rented and operated, the land operated by (landless) tenants 
was Ill million acres (12 percent), and the rest (266 million acres, 28 percent) is rented and 
operated by producers who not only cultivate their own land but also the rented land. 
22. If the production function is linearly homogeneous, then land yield is independent of L. 
But in this case the equilibrium farm size is indeterminate. 
23. These twelve commodities are wheat, rice, corn, sorghum, barley, oats, cotton, tobacco, 
peanuts, sugar, milk, and wool. 
24. Teigen also reports that the total number of farmers for all groups has declined from 2.7 
million in 1969 to 2.3 million in 1978. 
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Figure 1. Target Price and Long Run Equilibrium Rent 
p* = 2 
